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Work aimed at studying social cognition in an interactionist perspective often encounters
substantial theoretical and methodological difﬁculties: identifying the signiﬁcant behavioral
variables; recording them without disturbing the interaction; and distinguishing between:
(a) the necessary and sufﬁcient contributions of each individual partner for a collective
dynamics to emerge; (b) features which derive from this collective dynamics and escape
from the control of the individual partners; and (c) the phenomena arising from this collec-
tive dynamics which are subsequently appropriated and used by the partners.We propose
a minimalist experimental paradigm as a basis for this conceptual discussion: by reducing
the sensory inputs to a strict minimum, we force a spatial and temporal deployment of the
perceptual activities, which makes it possible to obtain a complete recording and control
of the dynamics of interaction. After presenting the principles of this minimalist approach
to perception, we describe a series of experiments on two major questions in social cogni-
tion: recognizing the presence of another intentional subject; and phenomena of imitation.
In both cases, we propose explanatory schema which render an interactionist approach
to social cognition clear and explicit. Starting from our earlier work on perceptual crossing
we present a new experiment on the mechanisms of reciprocal recognition of the percep-
tual intentionality of the other subject: the emergent collective dynamics of the perceptual
crossing can be appropriated by each subject. We then present an experimental study of
opaque imitation (when the subjects cannot see what they themselves are doing). This
study makes it possible to characterize what a properly interactionist approach to imitation
might be. In conclusion, we draw on these results, to show how an interactionist approach
can contribute to a fully social approach to social cognition.
Keywords: perceptual crossing, imitation, recognition of intentionality, interaction, minimalism
INTRODUCTION
Research on social cognition often ﬁnds itself caught in an uneasy,
paradoxical tension. On the one hand, understanding social phe-
nomena requires giving an essential place to collective dynamics.
On the other hand, from the viewpoint of cognitive science, one
adopts a more or less explicit version of methodological individu-
alism according to which social interactions must be explained on
the basis of individual capacities. In this case, it is indeed difﬁcult
to maintain that there exist components which are proper to the
collective domain, especially if one admits that such components
only take on meaning if they are taken up in individual experience,
and moreover that the explanation of the emergence of such com-
ponents is based on individual competencies. It seems obvious that
if there is a social interaction, the interacting subjects must possess
the individual competences that are necessary for this interaction
to occur. It would therefore seem a legitimate method to isolate
the subjects in order to identify these competences, before going
on to study how the individuals interact. The classical approaches,
prolonging such a procedure, consider that these individual com-
petences correspond to all the social know-how and knowledge
involved: a capacity to recognize other subjects, to imitate, and
ﬁnally common-sense psychology (theory of mind). But in this
case, how is it possible to account for the inter-individual coor-
dination of actions in space and time in order to attain shared
goals and to organize in society according to a particular culture?
The classical answer is to suppose that individual capacities for
coordination and joint attention make it possible to share rep-
resentations of current objects and events (Sebanz et al., 2006;
Knoblich et al., 2011); and it is thought that the neurological basis
for these capacities are to be found in the“mirror-neuron” systems
which associate representations of actions performed with repre-
sentations of observed movements (Blakemore and Decety, 2001;
Gallese et al., 2004; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Gallese, 2007).
However, if a “representation” is a state or process that is strictly
internal to each subject, the collective remains in fact internalized
in each subject (Tomasello et al., 2005; Thomas et al., 2006) and it
is quite difﬁcult to understand how the “social” as such could play
a constitutive role (see for example the synthetic dossier in Topics
in Cognitive science; Galantucci and Sebanz, 2009).
By contrast, interactionist approaches postulate that interac-
tions play a role right from the start in the constitution of social
phenomena. These are ancient traditions in social psychology and
philosophy, from the work of George Herbert Mead (Gillespie,
2005) and Erwing Goffman (Goffman and Best, 2005) to the
pragmatist approach of John Dewey (Petras, 1968) or the social
psychology of Theodore Newcomb (Newcomb et al., 1966), from
the phenomenology of Alfred Schütz (Schütz, 1970) to the work
of Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger (Berger and Luckmann,
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1966). This sort of attention to interactions is found currently
in the framework of theories of development (Trevarthen, 1993;
Reddy, 2008), in dynamical systems theory (Coleman andWatson,
2000; Fogel,2006), in the current of ecological psychology (Gibson,
1986), in enactive cognitive science (De Jaegher et al., 2010), and
recently in certain areas of neuroscience (Schilbach et al., 2006;
Dumas, 2011). However, all these studies are still affected by a
tension between the collective aspects and individual cognition.
For example, studies in ecological psychology bear essen-
tially on phenomena of the coordination of action (Schmidt and
Richardson, 2008). These phenomena turn out to be very gen-
eral, and can be explained by mechanisms related to the physics of
embodiment and perceptual systems. However, it seems to us that
this approach lacks an explanation of the passage from coordina-
tions of this sort, and social interactions that aremeaningful for the
actors themselves. Similarly, in the framework of externalist con-
ceptions of situated cognition and the extended mind (Hutchins,
1995; Clark and Chalmers, 1998) one can develop models of social
activity based on a shared material and technical environment.
And in the perspective of embodied embedded cognition (van Dijk
et al., 2008), one can seek to understand social behaviors in terms
of the relations of the organism with its social ecological niche
(Marsh et al., 2009), or with social norms (Steiner and Stewart,
2009). But in all these cases, the social structures, or traces left by
collective activity, must at some point be mobilized by individu-
als; and this requires understanding how the environment comes
to have such a meaning for the actors themselves – for example,
how they come to recognize other organisms as intentional sub-
jects, how they recognize the behaviors as action following some
norms.
In the enactive approach, explanations start from the viewpoint
of the living organism (Varela et al., 1999). Rather than evoking
internal representations, this approach is based on the coupling
between an organism and its environment which results in the
enaction of a meaningful world. In this framework, De Jaegher
proposes to articulate the collective dynamics of social interactions
and individual autonomy. The interaction between organisms is
regulated by the organisms themselves through an activity of col-
lective construction of meaning, a participatory sense-making (De
Jaegher andDi Paolo,2007). In this version, the interactionist posi-
tion can postulate that social capacities and knowledge are actually
constituted in the very course of social interactions; the essential
aspects of individual social capacities are the result, and not the
cause, of social interactions (McGann and De Jaegher, 2009; De
Jaegher et al., 2010).
Now even this strong interactionist position poses a certain
number of theoretical and methodological difﬁculties. First of all,
methodologically, it is necessary to identify the relevant behavioral
variables, and to record them without disturbing the interaction.
Even more important, in order to account for the emergence of
social phenomena in the course of the interaction, it is necessary
to clearly identify and distinguish between (a) what is contributed
by the individual subjects and (b) what is contributed by the actual
dynamics of the interaction, in order to show that the dynamics
of inter-individual interaction leads to more than what the indi-
vidual organisms in interaction bring to the situation. At the same
time, it is also necessary to explain (c) how some of these emergent
phenomena can be subsequently appropriated by the individuals
(Froese and Di Paolo, 2011b). As a basis for this methodologi-
cal and conceptual discussion, we will propose here a minimalist
experimental paradigm for the study of perceptual interactions in
which it will be possible to clearly distinguish these three com-
ponents. This will allow us to propose some explanatory schema
concerning two major questions in social cognition: the recogni-
tion of the presence of another intentional subject; and the realm
of imitation. In order to present this experimental paradigm and
to argue for its heuristic value, we start by describing a minimalist
method for the analysis of individual perception.
A MINIMALIST EXPERIMENTAL METHOD FOR THE STUDY OF
PERCEPTION
Many empirical studies of inter-individual interactions proceed
by setting up well-controlled conditions of observation (Marsh
et al., 2009). However, even if the sorts of actions that can be per-
formed are simpliﬁed as much as possible, the subjects interact
using their natural perceptual systems. It is therefore very difﬁcult
to observe the internalmechanisms for controlling the actions, and
it is difﬁcult to understand the link between these actions and the
social meaning that the individuals attribute to the interactions.
The minimalist method that we propose here aims at providing
the means to answer these questions, by precisely controlling the
perceptual activities of the subjects in interaction. To do this, we
base ourselves on studies of sensory substitution.
The general principle of such studies consists of transforming
the stimuli proper to one sensory modality (for example ocular
vision) to stimuli of a different sensory modality (for example
touch; Collins and Bach-y-Rita, 1973; Schiff and Foulke, 1982;
Visell, 2009). On condition that the user is active (manipulat-
ing the camera by lateral movement, rotation and zoom), (s)he
is able to develop spectacular perceptual capabilities, in particular
for the spatial localization and recognition of shapes (Guarniero,
1974; Bach-y-Rita, 2004). The use of a technical mediation for
perception has four major advantages:
(1) These devices enable the study of the genesis of a new kind of
perceptual modality, in an experimental situation that can be
closely controlled (Collins and Bach-y-Rita, 1973; Lenay et al.,
2003; Auvray and Myin, 2009). Of course, this sort of percep-
tion is quite particular, and has to occur on the background
of perceptual know-how already present for the user. Never-
theless, we are here in the presence of a genuine genesis of
novel perceptual capabilities which were clearly absent before
the learning process.
(2) The perceptual learning involved in this experiment is evi-
dence of an impressive plasticity of the central nervous system.
The tactile sensory input has nothing to do with that of ocu-
lar vision, just as the control of the camera with the hands
has nothing to do with the commands to ocular muscles and
the head. Nevertheless, the technical device deﬁnes a space of
coupling, a speciﬁc set of sensorimotor regularities. In condi-
tions suitable for progressive learning, the use of this device
leads to vast functional reorganization (Bach-y-Rita, 1990; De
Volder et al., 1999),which results in robust, general know-how
(Bach-y-Rita and Kercel, 2003) and a perceptual world where
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the shapes and events are highly analogous to those involved
in visual perception.
(3) The opportunity of working with adult subjects makes it
possible to combine a psycho-physiological study of this per-
ceptual genesis with a phenomenological description of alter-
ations in lived experience (Lenay and Steiner, 2010; Ward and
Meijer, 2010).
(4) The fourth advantage of using such technical mediation of
perception is that it can simplify the repertoires of actions
and sensory feedback which are available to the subject, and
render them amenable to precise observation. We can then
study, in each case, what objects can be constituted and what
are the operations involved in this constitution.
In order to determine the minimal technical conditions which
are necessary to enable the perception of an externalized object
in a space where it can be localized, we have simpliﬁed the sys-
tem of Bach-y-Rita to a single photoelectric cell connected to a
single tactile stimulator. At each moment, the blindfolded subject
thus receives only a minimal amount of information (1 bit) corre-
sponding to the presence or absence of the tactile stimulation. We
have been able to show that even with such a simple device, the
spatial localization of luminous sources remains possible (Lenay
et al., 1997). Here, it is manifestly clear that the perception can-
not be based on an internal analysis of the sensory information,
because this information has no intrinsic spatiality whatsoever. It
is thus only through the movements of his/her exploratory activity
that the subject can succeed in performing the perceptual task. By
reducing the sensory input to a strict minimum, we force the sub-
ject to deploy a perceptual activity in the form of trajectories that
can easily be observed and recorded. By construction, so to say,
we adopt the theoretical framework of active perception (Varela,
1979; Gibson, 1986; Brooks, 1991; O’Regan and Noë, 2001). The
spatial characteristics of an object are deﬁned by the “Laws of Sen-
sorimotor Contingency”; i.e., the laws which govern the sensory
feedback as a function of the actions performed.
It is useful to go even further in the simpliﬁcation by reducing
the dimensions of action to two or even just one single dimension.
On this principle, we have developed the “Tactos system” which
will be used in the experiments involving social interactions that
we shall present below (see Figure 1). This system consists essen-
tially of a device for controlling tactile stimulators (Braille cells
which electronically generate the movements of small pins) as a
function of the movements of the cursor on a computer screen;
the receptor ﬁeld is guided by a pointing device (mouse, touch-
pad, graphic tablet, or tactile screen), and when it passes over a
colored pixel it commands the activation of an all-or-nothing tac-
tile stimulator placed under the ﬁnger (see Lenay et al., 2003 for
details).
In these highly restrictive experimental conditions, it has been
shown that the users (blind persons or blindfolded adults) can
learn to recognize simple shapes. As explained above, the spa-
tial perception of a shape is necessarily active because there is no
intrinsic spatiality in the sensory input. This perception is thus
realized essentially through a perceptual trajectory that can easily
be recorded, analyzed, and modeled (Stewart and Gapenne, 2004).
Of course, the space of all the motor commands that produce
FIGURE 1 |The ‘Tactos’ system.The shapes inscribed in the digital space
on the screen are perceived in the tactile mode. The stylus of the graphic
tablet controls the movements on the screen of a receptor ﬁeld.When this
receptor ﬁeld encounters a black pixel, the software triggers an
all-or-nothing tactile stimulus on the ﬁnger of the non-dominant hand. For
the experimental studies presented here we use a single receptor ﬁeld
coupled to an activation of all the tactile pins of the Braille cells.
movements of the hand and arm is vast; but the relevant space
of signiﬁcant actions is deﬁned by the interface, and boils down
to translations of the receptor ﬁeld in the space where the shapes
are situated. Besides, one observes that during the course of learn-
ing the attention of the subjects, which was initially focused on
the tactile stimulation, turns toward the space of two-dimensional
action. It is in this space that the subjects situate themselves and
act. An interesting consequence of this radical minimalism is that
the perceptual trajectories for localizing or recognizing shapes, as
well as the perceptual strategies that make it possible to carry them
out, seem to be the same whether the sensory feedback is tactile,
auditory, or visual (Gapenne et al., 2005). It therefore seems that
the simplicity of the device makes it possible to elucidate some of
the fundamental properties of the perception, independently of
the sensory modality. Moreover, to the extent that the space that
is explored is deﬁned by a computer, the Tactos system makes it
possible to set up a virtual space which can be shared by several
users, even physically situated at a distance. It is this experimental
setup that forms the basis for the experiments on social interac-
tion that we shall now describe. In each case, this setup allows to
clearly distinguish (a) the necessary and sufﬁcient contributions of
each individual partner; (b) that which emerges from the collective
dynamics; and (c) that which can be subsequently appropriated by
the individual partners.
AN EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM FOR THE STUDY OF THE
RECOGNITION OF ANOTHER SUBJECT
Classically, in the framework of the philosophy of mind and the
representationalist paradigm in cognitive science, one considers
that the problemof the recognition of another subject comes down
to the question of the adoption of an “intentional stance” with
respect to the object in question (Dennett, 1971; Heider, 1982;
Tremoulet and Feldman, 2000). In this framework, the question is
thus to determine the criteria and mechanisms used by the sub-
jects in deciding to treat the perceived objects, either as simple
“things” which obey a mechanical causality, or else as “inten-
tional agents” who act as a function of internal representations
and goals. Various approaches are in competition, from the“simu-
lation theory” (Meltzoff, 1995) which of late incorporates internal
structures such as “mirror neurons” (Gallese et al., 2004) to the
“theory theory” (Gergely et al., 1995; Csibra et al., 2003), passing
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by the hypothesis of low-level perceptual modules (Leslie, 1987;
Premack, 1990; Baron-Cohen and Cross, 1992; Povinelli et al.,
2000; Tomasello et al., 2005). However, in spite of their diversity
and above and beyond their oppositions, all these theories are
based on the same type of experimental method. In all cases one
establishes a strict separation between the observing subject and
the scene that is observed.
By contrast, in an interactionist approach to this question the
recognition of an intentional subject ought to take place during an
interaction where the perceived subject can reciprocally recognize
the observer himself as an intentional subject. We designate by the
term “perceptual crossing” all those situations where two percep-
tual activitiesmeet, as for example inmutual touching, lookswhere
both subjects “catch each other’s eyes,” or a proto-conversation
between mother and infant (Butterworth and Jarrett, 1991). The
feelings of intimacy and the importance of the emotional values
attached to this sort of inter-individual interaction are well known
(Argyle and Dean, 1965). It is commonly reported that there is
a feeling of immediate reciprocal recognition of the presence of
another perceptual intentionality (Farroni et al., 2002). There is
a question, however: when two subjects catch each other’s eyes,
for example, is it because the subjects recognize each other as
intentional subjects that they look at each other; or is it the other
way round, because the looks are ﬁxed on each other that there
is reciprocal recognition as intentional subjects? (Baron-Cohen
and Cross, 1992; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) In the ﬁrst case, each
subject starts by unilaterally judging the presence of another sub-
ject on the basis of his behavior before entering into interaction,
unless of course this interaction can supervene independently of
any attribution of intentionality (Tomasello et al., 2005). In the
second case, it is the perceptual interaction itself which produces
the mutual recognition. In this case, the situation of perceptual
crossing makes it possible to discriminate the speciﬁcity of a per-
ceptual activity directed at oneself. In order to give an empirical
content to this intuition we have used the minimalist experimen-
tal paradigm described above, in a form which gives rise to an
elementary sort of perceptual crossing. As explained above, this
situation allows for a precise and detailed observation of the joint
perceptual dynamics. An initial experimental study of this sort,
which has already been presented elsewhere (Lenay et al., 2006;
Di Paolo et al., 2008; Auvray et al., 2009), must nevertheless be
presented in some detail here because it will serve as the basis for
the following experiments.
EXPERIMENT 1: STUDY OF PERCEPTUAL CROSSING
In order to purify the notion of “perceptual crossing,” and to make
it possible to proceed to a precise analysis of the mutual dynamics,
we have reduced the space of action of the participants to a single
dimension, and reduced also the repertoire of sensory input to a
single all-or-nothing stimulation (just 1 bit of information at each
time-point). Two blindfolded participants are placed in different
rooms, and can only interact via the device. They each explore a
computer screen with a mouse, and receive tactile stimulation on
the index ﬁnger of their free hand. The movements of the mouse
control the movements of a receptor ﬁeld of 4 pixels in a one-
dimensional space. Only the horizontal movements of the mouse
are taken into account. The space of action consists of a straight
line 600 pixels long, which loops round to form a continuous cir-
cle so as to avoid edge-effects. Various objects, consisting of black
pixels, are placed on this line. Each time the receptor ﬁeld encoun-
ters a black pixel, the participant receives an all-or-nothing tactile
stimulation on the Braille cell (see Figure 2).
FIGURE 2 |The unidimensional space of perceptual interaction.With
the mouse of their computer, each subject moves a receptor ﬁeld on a
straight line in a shared digital space.When the two receptor ﬁelds meet
each other, each user receives a tactile stimulus on his free hand. Here,
the receptor ﬁelds can be perceived (they are thus also body-objects
perceivable by the partner).
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Two systems of this sort are connected in a network, so that the
two participants share the same one-dimensional space. There are
three sorts of objects that each participant can encounter:
(1) The body-object of the other participant (his perceived body)
which exactly matches his receptor ﬁeld (4 pixels wide).When
the two participants are in the same position, each receives
an all-or-nothing tactile stimulation. We call this situation
“perceptual crossing.”
(2) A ﬁxed object that we call the “ﬁxed lure”: this is a segment
4 pixels wide. The ﬁxed lure for the participant 1 is invisible
for the participant 2, and is placed in a different position than
the ﬁxed lure for participant 2 (see Figure 3).
(3) A moving object (4 pixels wide) that we call the “mobile
lure.” In order to ensure that the mobile lure would have
the same richness of movement as the body-object of the
other participant, but without being responsive to perceptual
crossings, we attached it by a rigid virtual link to the receptor
ﬁeld/body-object of the partner. The mobile lure thus follows
exactly, but at a constant distance, all the movements per-
formed by the partner. The lure was placed 50 pixels to the
right of the receptor ﬁeld (see Figure 3). In all that follows,
distances between two objects are measured in pixels from
the left-most pixel of one object to the left-most pixel of the
other.
This experimental conﬁgurationmakes it possible to test a theoret-
ical hypothesis: even though the mobile lure and the body-object
of the partner (which corresponds to his/her receptor ﬁeld) have
objectively exactly the same movements, will the participants be
able to distinguish them on the sole basis that the receptor ﬁeld
of the partner is sensitive and animated by a perceptual activity
turned toward their own movements?
Ten pairs of participants took part in this experiment. The
participants were blindfolded and placed in different rooms. It
is explained to them that the left/right movements of the mouse
allow them to move in a shared one-dimensional space. In this
space they can encounter three sorts of objects: a ﬁxed object; a
mobile object; and the body-object of their partner. The relation
between the mobile object and the body-object of the partner is
not explained to them. The instruction was to click on the left
button of the mouse when they judged that they had met their
partner. This experimental setup has a number of advantages:
(1) The perceptual situation is radically novel for the subjects. We
thus avoid the direct importation of knowledge already elabo-
rated. On the contrary, a learning period is necessary, and this
makes it possible to observe the genesis of the phenomena.
(2) The reduction of the sensory input forces a spatial and tem-
poral deployment of the perceptual activities, and this makes
it possible to record them and to analyze them in detail.
(3) The simplicity of the setup makes it possible to elucidate the
sufﬁcient conditions for a detailed explanatory scheme of the
collective dynamics, which we may hope has some generality.
The results for all the participants and all the sessions showed
that the majority of clicks (62%) occurred when the two partners
were indeed in front of each other, i.e., in a situation of perceptual
crossing (see Figure 4).
We then analyzed the distribution of clicks as a function of the
cause of the stimulations received by the participant during the
preceding 2 s. The results over all the participants show that 66%
(±4) of the clicks follow stimulations from perceptual crossing;
23% (±10) of the clicks follow stimulations due to the mobile
lure; and only 11% (±9) follow stimulations due to the ﬁxed
lure. These results show that the participants are able to distin-
guish between the three categories of object that they encounter in
the one-dimensional space. They distinguish between the recep-
tor ﬁeld of the partner and an object, be it ﬁxed or mobile. This
overall success may seem surprising since, by construction, the
mobile lure has exactly the same movement as the receptor ﬁeld of
their partner. It seems that what is recognized is indeed the activity
of a perceptual subject directed toward themselves, and not just
the objective structure of the movements (Wilkerson, 1999). How-
ever, further analysis shows that this apparent success at the overall
level masks what was actually a revealing failure at the individual
level.
We ﬁrst carried out a comparison between the distribution of
the clicks and the distribution of the tactile stimulations received.
The overall results for all the participants show that 52% (±12)
of the stimulations come from a perceptual crossing, 33% (±12)
come from the ﬁxed lure, and only 15% (±6) from the mobile lure
(see Table 1; Figure 4).
When we calculate the ratio of clicks/stimulations, we ﬁnd 0.33
for the ﬁxed lure, 1.26 for the perceptual crossing, and 1.51 for the
mobile lure. These results show a major difference between the
ﬁxed lure on one hand (0.33) and the mobile entities on the other
FIGURE 3 | Schematic illustration of the one-dimensional space explored by the subjects. Subject P1 receives a tactile stimulus whenever (s)he
encounters either his ﬁxed object, or the receptor ﬁeld of subject P2, or the mobile object attached to the receptor ﬁeld of P2.
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FIGURE 4 | Distribution of frequencies as a function of the distance
between the receptor fields of the two participants.The ﬁne line
represents the total frequency of clicks made: 62% of the distribution lies
between ±30pixels. The thick line represents the total frequency of
stimulations received by the subjects: 28% of the distribution lies between
±30pixels. In both cases, there is a clear peak around the distance 0 pixels,
i.e., the situation of perceptual crossing, which shows that there is an
attractor at this point, at least in the weak descriptive sense that once the
subjects have attained the situation of perceptual crossing they tend to
remain in this stable dynamic conﬁguration. A minor peak at the distance of
50 pixels (marked by an arrow) corresponds to the mobile lure.
Table 1 | Distribution of the clicks and of the tactile stimulations –
experiment 1.
Receptor field Mobile lure Fixed lure
Percentage of clicks 66±4 23±10 11±9
Percentage of stimulations 52±12 15±6 33±12
Ratio clicks/stimulations 1.26 1.51 0.33
(1.26 and 1.51). The participants have a probability of clicking that
is four times greater if the stimulation comes from a mobile entity
than it is due to the ﬁxed lure. Thus, the ratio between clicks and
stimulations shows that overall each participant does not seem to
distinguish between stimulations due to perceptual crossing and
stimulations due to the mobile lure (1.26 vs. 1.51). The difference
in clicks on the mobile lure and on the receptor ﬁeld of their part-
ner (23 vs. 66%) seems to be due only to strategies of movement
which are such that encounters with the mobile lure are much less
frequent than encounters due to perceptual crossing (15 vs. 52%).
If the participants succeed in the task, it is essentially because they
succeed in situating themselves face-to-face with their partner, and
not because they recognize in the pattern of stimulation any clues
which discriminate the receptor ﬁeld of their partner from that
of the mobile lure. The only difference resides in the interaction
itself. In order to account for these results, there are two things to
be explained. On the one hand, the capacity of the participants to
privilege the situation of being face-to-face; on the other hand, the
reasons that leads them to click.
Attractor in the collective dynamics
We may note that all the observations made with these minimal-
ist setups show that the perception of an object in a particular
position is realized by its active, reversible exploration: the sub-
jects come and go around the singularity that provokes a sensory
return (Sribunruangrit et al., 2004). Thus, there is a general strat-
egy which consists of reversing the movement of the receptor ﬁeld
following a sensory event. To the extent that the perceptual strategy
of each participant consists of inverting their movement following
an alteration in sensory input, if a participant meets their partner
(s)he will invert his movement while the latter will do the same.
The two receptor ﬁelds will thus enter into a sort of dance. This can
be described as constituting an attractor in the collective dynam-
ics; an attractor which is not a spatially ﬁxed point, but a region
which may itself be displaced. Even though the participants do not
have a speciﬁcally collaborative aim, their simultaneous efforts to
discriminate the presence of their partner produces an attractor in
the collective dynamics of their perceptual activities (Froese and
Di Paolo, 2010, 2011a).
The reasons that lead the subjects to click
If we study the events which precede each click, we observe that if
over the last 2 s of his perceptual activity a subject meets:
(1) few stimulations, no perception is constituted and the proba-
bility of clicking is low;
(2) many stimulations, but for an object that is recognized as ﬁxed
(sensorimotor stability), the probability of clicking is again
low;
(3) but if there are many stimulations, for an object that remains
undetermined spatially, the probability of clicking is high (see
Figure 5).
In the latter case, the participant is probably in the presence of the
other participant, but it is also possible that it is the mobile lure.
Thus the clicks of the participants can be largely explained by the
conjunction of two criteria, one negative and one positive:
(1) “Another subject” is something which resists precise spatial
determination: it is neither a ﬁxed object, nor an object with
movements determined by a simple rule.
(2) However, at the same time, “another subject” is something
which maintains its presence. This is indeed a characteris-
tic of the body-object of another participant, but not of the
mobile lure, because it is only this body-object which has a
receptor ﬁeld sensitive in its turn to the presence of objects,
i.e., likely to change its behavior according to the sensory input
it receives. The (only) difference between the receptor ﬁeld of
the other participant and the mobile lure attached to it is that
only the former is sensitive to my presence; and as we have
seen, this sensitivity is linked to a perceptual intentionality
which constantly aims at remaining in the vicinity of a singu-
larity. This is precisely a sufﬁcient condition for the formation
of an attractor in the joint dynamics which tends to augment
the probability that the partner will be present. Thus, the cri-
terion which seems to be employed by the participants for
clicking is not arbitrary, but ensues logically from the meeting
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FIGURE 5 | Probability of clicking.The probability of participants’ clicks,
plotted as a function of the number of distinct stimulations received during
the preceding 2 s. Lozenges: total stimulations (body-object, ﬁxed object, and
mobile lure); Squares: stimulations due to encounters with the ﬁxed object;
Triangles: stimulations due to encounters with a moving object (avatar or
mobile lure). Error bars represent the standard errors of the means.
of two perceptual intentionalities. This criterion is coherent
with the very content of that which is to be recognized. The
other subject is recognized just as something that resists its
precise determination and yet which persists in being present.
An analysis of the phenomenological descriptions given by
the subjects themselves would exceed the limits of this article.
It is sufﬁcient to note here that the modiﬁcations of the lived
experience of the subjects can only be built on the basis of the
objective elements that we present.
However, even if these criteria seem judicious, they are not suf-
ﬁcient here to guarantee against a failure to distinguish between
the receptor ﬁeld of the partner and the mobile lure. If by a stroke
of bad luck it is the mobile lure which remains present, the par-
ticipants have the same probability of clicking as for the receptor
ﬁeld. For example, if the receptor ﬁeld of my partner is engaged
in oscillating around an object situated at 50 pixels from my own
position, and thus causing amovement of the attached lure around
my own position, I will be induced to click on the attached lure.
Conclusion to experiment 1
In this ﬁrst experiment where the aim is to discriminate the pres-
ence of another subject, the individuals fail whereas the collective
action succeeds. Thus, the collective success cannot be explained
by an individual capacity to recognize another subject by means of
a particular sensation (Michael and Overgaard, 2012). The collec-
tive success is explained principally by a collective dynamics which
results from the engagement of each subject in his perceptual activ-
ity searching for a partner. The clicks result from a decision rule
which appears to be judicious, but which is insufﬁcient at the
individual level to distinguish between speciﬁc sensations.
The question which arises now for an interactionist approach
is whether it is possible for the individuals to appropriate the
collective success. This seems feasible if we relax a particularly
unrealistic condition of our experimental situation in which there
was no intrinsic difference between the various objects. If the sub-
jects are able to recognize different intrinsic properties for the three
objects, they may be able to use these properties to categorize the
different situations of interaction in which they are engaged. In
order to show that this is the case, we have carried out a new
experiment with a protocol that is very similar, but which this
time consists of categorizing the objects (ﬁxed lure, mobile lure,
and receptor ﬁeld) that can be easily discriminated in their own
right.
EXPERIMENT 2: RECOGNITION OF PERCEPTUAL CROSSING
The experimental setup is the same as that of the ﬁrst experiment,
except that this time the sensory feedback is no longer a tactile
stimulus, but a sound which is different for each of the objects
which can be encountered.
Method
Twenty participants took part in this experiment. Their ages
ranged from 20 to 32 years (mean age of 22.4 years). All of the par-
ticipants reported normal tactile perception. The experiment took
approximately 25min to complete and was performed in accor-
dance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1991 Declaration
of Helsinki.
We used an adapted version of the minimalist sensory sub-
stitution system Tactos. Blindfolded participants explored graphic
information by means of a computer mouse and received auditory
information via headphones. The displacement of the computer
mouse produced the displacement of a 4-pixel receptor ﬁeld in a
one-dimensional space (a line 600 pixels long,with the ends joined
to form a torus). Only the horizontal displacement of the mouse
was taken into account. Several objects consisting of black pixels
were situated on this line. Each time the receptor ﬁeld covered a
black pixel, a sound is emitted which varies according to the nature
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of the object. There are three possible sounds: (1) the horn of a
car, (2) the horn of a big lorry, and (3) the tinkling of a bicycle bell.
These sounds were chosen to be easily differentiated and named.
Two Tactos devices were combined in a network so that each pair
of participants shared a common one-dimensional space. As in
the previous experiment, each participant could encounter three
types of object:
(1) The 4-pixel receptor ﬁeld of the other participant.
(2) A ﬁxed 4-pixel wide object. The ﬁxed object perceived by par-
ticipant 1 was placed between 148 and 152 pixels and was
invisible for participant 2; the ﬁxed object perceived by par-
ticipant 2 was placed between 448 and 452 pixels and was
invisible for participant 1.
(3) Amobile 4-pixelwide object. In order to ensure that themove-
ments of this object have exactly the same dynamic structure
as the movements of a receptor ﬁeld, two conditions were
tested:
(i) Condition C1: the mobile object was attached by a vir-
tual rigid link at a distance 100 pixels from the center
of the receptor ﬁeld (see Figure 3). It should be noted
that when participant 1 explored participant 2’s mobile
object, participant 2 did not receive any auditory feed-
back (and conversely, participant 1 did not receive any
auditory feedback when his mobile object was explored
by participant 2). In contrast, when one of the partici-
pants explored the other participant’s receptor ﬁeld, both
received auditory feedback.
(ii) Condition C2: just like C1 except that the mobile object is
animated by the trajectory of the partner recorded from
the previous session.
Procedure
Each pair of participants performed the experiment once. They
were blindfolded and seated in different rooms in front of the Tac-
tos device. There was no means of communicating between the
participants other than the experimental setup. The functioning
of the device – the relation between the receptor ﬁeld, the objects in
the environment, and the auditory feedback – was explained to the
participants. The participants were then trained on the device dur-
ing three phases of 1min each: exploration of three ﬁxed objects to
which the three soundswere attributed (we veriﬁed that the sounds
were clearly differentiated); exploration of an object 4 pixels wide
moving at a constant speed of 15 pixels/s; then at 30 pixels/s. Then,
the experimental task was explained to the participants. They were
told that they could freely explore the one-dimensional space con-
taining three types of auditory object: (1) the receptor ﬁeld of the
partner, (2) ﬁxed objects, (3) and mobile objects. However, the
nature of the dynamics of the mobile object was not explained.
The instruction was to associate a sound to each of the three types
of objects.
There were four sessions of 2min each. In sessions S1 and S2
the condition was C1 (attached lure), in session S3 and S4 the
condition was C2 (the lure follows the recorded movements of the
partner in session S2). A sound was associated with each object;
the sounds are reattributed differently and randomly for each ses-
sion. At the end of the four sessions the strategies and impressions
of each participant are noted and recorded.
Results
First of all, we looked at the frequency of correct responses for
each of the three objects (see Table 2).
For the set of all 80 sessions (considering each participant inde-
pendently), 60 were perfect. There was an improvement between
sessions 1 and 4. This may be explained by an effect of learning
with respect to the setup, but also with respect to the behavior
of the partner which stays the same. This learning effect masks
any possible difference between conditions C1 and C2. The ease of
identifying the ﬁxed object is conﬁrmed by a success rate of almost
94%. If we consider that this recognition is generally achieved,
the results for the categorization of the other two objects remain
largely signiﬁcant, especially in the fourth session where the suc-
cess rate for the 20 participants is 85% compared to the chance
rate of 50%.
We then examined the relation between the success of one par-
ticipant and the concomitant success of the partner. Of the 60
sessions which were perfect for one participant, 46 (77%) were
also perfect for the other participant, whereas by chance there
would have been 35 (59%; χ2 = 3.46, p< 0.07).
Analysis and conclusion for experiment 2
After self-learning, the results of this complementary experiment
are signiﬁcantly in favor of a good categorization of the sound cor-
responding to the presence of the partner. There is no signiﬁcant
difference between the conditions C1 and C2 (attached lure or
recorded lure). The analysis of the behavioral trajectories, and the
questions posed at the end of the experiment, allow us to elucidate
the strategies of the participants.
Almost all the participants adopt a “sweeping” technique when
they encounter an object, i.e., they oscillate around the position
where they perceived an object. A large majority of the partici-
pants ﬁrst sought to identify the ﬁxed object (19± 18% of the
positions are concentrated between +30 and −30 pixels from the
ﬁxed lure, out of the 800 pixels of the total space), and then they
Table 2 | Frequency of correct responses – experiment 2.
Partner (%) Mobile object (%) Fixed object (%) Perfect 3/3 (%) χ2 test (%)
Success over all four sessions 77.50 75.00 93.75 75.00 2.53 (signiﬁcant)
Success session S1 (C1) 65.00 65.00 95.00 65.00 17.97 (not signiﬁcant)
Success session S2 (C1) 75.00 75.00 95.00 75.00 2.53 (signiﬁcant)
Success session S3 (C2) 85.00 75.00 90.00 75.00 2.53 (signiﬁcant)
Success session S4 (C2) 85.00 85.00 95.00 85.00 0.17 (highly signiﬁcant)
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sought to remain in contact with a mobile object. When two par-
ticipants meet, they “sweep” on each other and seek to remain in
contact. In this way, we ﬁnd again a dynamic attractor around
the position of perceptual crossing, although it is somewhat less
marked than in the previous experiment (21± 8% of the positions
are concentrated between +30 and −30 pixels from the position
of the receptor ﬁeld of their partner). When that succeeds sufﬁ-
ciently, they decide that it is their partner. When they fail to follow
a mobile object, they decide that it is a lure which is indifferent to
their presence (16± 7% between +30 and −30 pixels around the
mobile lure).
As in the ﬁrst experiment, the collective dynamics results from
the common engagement of both participants in the perceptual
activity. We may note in addition that the success of one partic-
ipant has an inﬂuence on the success of his partner. This can be
easily understood, since the two participants are engaged in the
same perceptual task. If for example one of the participants does
not move his receptor ﬁeld, his partner will have no means of
distinguishing it from the ﬁxed lure.
What explains the individual success here is the ability of the
participants to distinguish the dynamics of perceptual crossing
from the dynamics of interacting with other objects. Since the
participants have access to different intrinsic properties for the
three objects, they can recognize different occurrences of the same
object. Thus, the different sounds make it possible to disambiguate
the situations of interaction: faced with a lure which presents
the same criteria which led the participants to click in the ﬁrst
experiment (frequent sensory stimulation combinedwith an inde-
terminate position), the participants no longer make the mistake.
The difference in the intrinsic properties allows them to recog-
nize that this situation is not the same as the encounter with
the other participant, which is more frequent because it corre-
sponds to a stronger attractor in the dynamics of interaction.
Thus, the situation of perceptual crossing is now recognized as
a property of an object already identiﬁed by other means. We
shall return to this point in the conclusions. Now that we have
been able to deﬁne the collective dynamics of perceptual cross-
ing (see Attractor in the Collective Dynamics), we may enquire
whether this form of synchronization may make it possible to
propose an original approach to the phenomena of imitation of
facial expressions.
PROCESSES OF IMITATION
It is indeed difﬁcult to understand how, just after birth, an infant
can establish a relation between the movements observed in a
conspeciﬁc subject and the proprioceptive data concerning her
own movements, in particular her opaque actions such as her own
facial movements that she cannot see herself (Meltzoff and Moore,
1997). Even though some authors are skeptical of the new-born
imitation data (Ray and Heyes, 2011), the phenomenon remains
interesting; and the importance of this correspondence problem
(Brass and Heyes, 2005) is not limited to imitation but applies
also to action understanding (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), the
use of tools (Ferrari et al., 2005), empathy (Gallese et al., 2004),
learning a language (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998), and the “the-
ory of mind” (Gallese, 2007). In the literature there are two main
positions concerning the underlying mechanisms.
The ﬁrst position consists of postulating an innate “Active
Intermodal Matching” system (AIM) which performs a supra-
modal representation of bodily actions which are seen or per-
formed (Meltzoff and Moore, 1999; Nagy, 2006). In this case,
an “innate mirror-neuron system” participates in the neuronal
cabling between perceived facial expressions and the expressions
that are produced (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti et al., 2002).
However this solution, as indeed all “hereditarian” solutions in
general, does not really explain anything at all, but consists of
merely giving oneself a phenomenon whose genesis remains to be
explained. If the question is that of explaining imitation, we have
to show that it can occur without any prior knowledge of it.
The second position consists of postulating a “learning” of this
matching between action and perception (Butterworth, 1999).
Sensorimotor training is supposed to conﬁgure these internal
structures by setting up an association between representations
of the actions and representations of their sensory consequences,
in particular visual consequences (Catmur et al., 2007, 2009; Cook
et al., 2010). If the question is that of explaining imitation,we have
to show that it can occur without any consciousness of imitating.
In both cases, imitation is postulated as being effected by struc-
tures that are internal to each individual, principally “mirror neu-
rons.”However, if one was able to account for a phenomenon that
appears as “imitation” without appealing to such internal struc-
tures, one would start to have the means to account for the setting
up of such structures, whether it be through individual learning or
by an evolutionary process. The path we propose to explore here
consists of seeking the conditions for the appearance of “mimetic
phenomena” in the very dynamics of the perceptual interactions –
and this in the absence of any previous internal knowledge of the
subjects concerning their own facial expressions. It is not the imi-
tation which accounts for the interactions, but the dynamics of
interaction which produces the imitation. Here again we propose
a particular experimental study which makes it possible to elabo-
rate a conceptual scheme, whose generality will of course have to
be examined subsequently.
EXPERIMENT 3: MIMETIC DYNAMICS IN THE PERCEPTUAL CROSSING
We have thus taken up our experiment of minimalist percep-
tual crossing; but this time, the participants can modify what
is presented to their partner. In accordance with our minimal-
ist approach, we have chosen as a minimal modiﬁcation of the
body the relative distance between the body-object and the recep-
tor ﬁeld. The objective external description of “imitation” will be
a similarity in the relative distances of the body-objects of the
two subjects, relative distances that the subjects themselves do not
perceive. If the subjects do succeed in matching these distances
(D1 and D2, see below), this will illustrate our contention that
“imitation” as such is largely in the eye of the beholder.
Methods
The experimental setup is the same as that of the ﬁrst experiment,
except that this time, there is no ﬁxed lure, and the receptor ﬁeld is
no longer directly perceivable by the partner. All that is perceivable
is the body-object that is attached to the receptor ﬁeld.
We call D1 the position of the body-object of participant 1
with respect to his receptor ﬁeld, and D2 for participant 2; the
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FIGURE 6 | Illustration of the displacements D1 and D2
between receptor field and body-object – experiment 3.The
subjects freely move their receptor ﬁeld in this one-dimensional
space. Their body-object follows exactly their movements. The
subject receives a tactile stimulation when his receptor ﬁeld covers
the body-object of the partner.
FIGURE 7 | Drift in perceptual crossing – experiment 3. In situation (A),
the perceptual crossing is balanced: (D1+D2)=0. The receptor ﬁeld of
participant P1 can cover the body-object of participant P2, at the same time
as the receptor ﬁeld of P2 covers the body-object of P1. On the other hand,
in situation (B), the perceptual crossing is subjected to a drift toward the
left: if the receptor ﬁeld of P1 covers the body-object of P2, P2 will have to
move to the left to ﬁnd the body-object of P1; but then P1 will have to move
to the left to recover the body-object of P2; and so on, resulting in a
systematic collective drift of both subjects to the left.
algebraic values of D1 or D2 are positive if the body-object is
to the right of the receptor ﬁeld, negative if it is to the left (see
Figure 6). If D1+D2= 0, when the receptor ﬁeld of P1 is exactly
in front of the body-object of P2, the receptor ﬁeld of P2 is also
directly in front of the body-object of P1. In this conﬁguration,
there should be no problem for achieving perceptual crossing since
the two partners perceive each other mutually at the same time.
However, if D1+D2< 0, the perceptual crossing is unbalanced,
each participant moving to the left to ﬁnd his partner. Similarly, if
D1+D2> 0, the perceptual crossing should drift to the right (see
Figure 7).
The distance between the receptor ﬁeld and his own body-
object can be actively modiﬁed by the participant. By clicking on
the right or left button of the mouse, the participants can displace
their body-object to the right or to the left relatively to their recep-
tor ﬁeld, 2 pixels at a time for each click. However, they do not
know the initial position of their body-object, and they cannot
perceive the receptor ﬁeld of their partner.
The body-objects and receptor ﬁelds all have a width of 8 pixels.
The displacement of the computer mouse produces the simulta-
neous displacement of the 8-pixel receptor ﬁeld and the 8-pixel
body-object in a one-dimensional space. Only the horizontal
displacement of the mouse was taken into account. The one-
dimensional space consisted of a line 800 pixels long,with the ends
joined to form a torus in order to avoid singularities due to edges.
Each time the receptor ﬁeld encounters a black pixel of the body-
object of his partner, the participant receives an all-or-nothing
tactile stimulation on the Braille cell.
Procedure
Twelve participants took part in this experiment. Their ages ranged
from 18 to 32 years (mean age of 20.4 years). All of the participants
reported normal tactile perception. The experiment took approxi-
mately 35min to complete and was performed in accordance with
the ethical standards laid down in the 1991Declarationof Helsinki.
The participants are blindfolded, placed in different rooms,
and able to interact only via the device. Each pair of partici-
pants performed the experiment once. The functioning of the
device – the relation between the receptor ﬁeld, the objects in
the environment, and the tactile feedback – was explained to the
participants. During a learning period (with D1+D2= 0), the
participants learned to maintain the situation of perceptual cross-
ing. The explicit instructions are the following: the participants
must be attentive to the possible drift of their perceptual crossing,
and that by clicking they can restore the balance. One informs
them that if they feel that the drift occurs toward the right they
should click on the left button, and vice versa. The experiment was
performed over four sessions of 3min each, with different starting
conditions:
S1: D1=+30, D2=+30 thus D1+D2= 60
S2: D1=+16, D2=+30 thus D1+D2= 46
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S3: D1=+30, D2=−30 thus D1+D2= 0
S4: D1=−16, D2=+ 30 thus D1+D2= 14
The participants are instructed to maintain the perceptual cross-
ing as long as possible. They do not know the position of their own
body-object, nor that of their partner. Each participant clicks left
or right according to his own feeling concerning the drift of the
perceptual crossing.
Results
Overall, there was clearly a convergence toward the situationwhere
D1+D2= 0, that we may identify as a situation of imitation.
Even though the participants do not know the position of their
body-object, either at the beginning or at the end, their joint
search for a situation of balanced perceptual crossing rapidly leads
to a similarity in these positions. In 3min, the disequilibria in
D1+D2 are reduced to less than 30% of their initial values (see
Table 3; Figure 8).
At the same time the diversity of the actual values for D1 or D2
increases over time [the standard deviation of (D1−D2) between
pairs of participants passes from 0 to 16 pixels]; this is understand-
able, since the positions of equilibrium that are sought belong
to an inﬁnite class of situations where D1+D2= 0. Even in S3,
where the initial position was already perfectly balanced, there is a
differentiation of the situations of equilibrium.
The condition S4 is also interesting because, given the width
of the receptor ﬁelds and body-objects (8 pixels), the participants
could have satisﬁed themselves with a state of equilibrium where
both participants remained immobile while receiving stimulation.
Nevertheless, what is observed is a continuation of the process of
convergence toward a better imitation (decrease inD1+D2). This
initial experiment thus enabled us to test our hypothesis: at least
in these experimental conditions, the collective dynamics leads to
a stabilization of a phenomenon of imitation.
Analysis
In order to understand how the participants manage to succeed
in this task, we can come back to the analysis of the perceptual
trajectories and sensory feedbacks, which represent all that the
participants have access to. We will then attempt to determine the
strategies adopted by the participants,whereby they link variations
in their sensory input to their subsequent actions. In Figure 9, we
illustrate the existence of an attractor in the relative positions,
X1–X2.
Even when (D1+D2) is relatively large, so that the participants
cannot both perceive each other simultaneously, the dynamics of
Table 3 |The initial and final values of (D1+D2), measured in pixels – experiment 3.
Experiment Initial state Average final state
D1+D2 D1+D2 Standard deviation D1+D2 Standard deviation D1−D2
S1 60 13 ±20 ±30.6
S2 46 10 ±14 ±23.3
S3 0 −1.6 ±4.8 ±1.8
S4 14 5 ±1.7 ±8.8
FIGURE 8 | Results of the first experimental session – experiment 3.
Legend. The ﬁne lines represent the evolution of (D1+D2), i.e., the distance
between the body-objects of the six pairs of subjects, over the course of the
3min of the session. The thick line represents the evolution of the mean of
(D1+D2). The dotted line indicates the dispersion of the values D1 and D2
(the standard deviation of the difference D1−D2).
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FIGURE 9 | An example of interaction trajectories.Time is indicated in
seconds on the abscissa. (A)The trajectory of participant 1 (X1) is in blue,
that of participant 2 (X2) in yellow (breaks in the trajectories correspond
simply to passages in the torus). Stimulations received are marked by
crosses on the trajectory. (B)The displacement between receptor ﬁeld
and body-object for participant 1, D1, is in thick yellow, and that of
participant 2, D2, in thick blue. The sum of the displacements (D1+D2) is
indicated by a black line. It can be seen that at the start the participants
drift toward the right (the bottom of the graph), then from t =55 s they
start to drift toward the left (the top of the graph) but slower and slower as
they progressively stabilize. At the start the displacement (D1+D2) is
60 pixels (D1=D2=30). The participants start clicking from t =72 s. From
t =125 s onward, the two subjects both receive a continuous stimulation
and they stop moving: (D1+D2)=4pixels.
interaction still exhibits a sort of perceptual crossing in the form
of a mutual oscillation of the participants around each other.
This “attractor” can be characterized by the standard deviation of
the distribution of distances between the participants1. As shown
in Figure 10, this attractor becomes narrower as the values of
(D1+D2) decrease; the participants are more and more often
in front of each other and their movements are more and more
reduced; the correlation coefﬁcient of 0.52 is highly signiﬁcant
(p<< 0.1). When (D1+D2) is less than 16, so that the two par-
ticipants could stopmoving in a situationwhere they both receive a
stimulation, it is striking to note that most often their activity con-
tinues and, on the average, the attractor of the perceptual crossing
narrows still further. In the fourth session, (D1+D2) decreases
to 5± 1.7 pixels. Here, it is clear that it is only with respect to
the dynamics of their interaction that the participants can grasp
whether or not there is a drift in their perceptual crossing, and
seek a situation with a well-balanced face-to-face.
1In the experiments illustrated in Figures 10, 11, and 12, the data making up
the distributions were collected at regular 1-s intervals over the course of the
experiments.
Viewed from the outside, the actions of the participants pro-
duce a tightening of the attractor in their dynamics of interaction.
The question arises as to the clues that the participants may use
to guide their adjustments of D1 and D2. As we have already
seen in the ﬁrst experiment, the participants seem to be sensi-
tive to the frequency of stimulations received whilst they seek to
establish a perceptual crossing. As shown in Figure 11, a decrease
in (D1+D2) is accompanied by an increase in the frequency
of stimulation: the correlation coefﬁcient of (−0.62) is highly
signiﬁcant.
Moreover, as shown in Figure 12, the participants may also be
sensitive to the systematic drift in their average positions over a 5-s
period. The correlation coefﬁcient of 0.342 is highly signiﬁcant.
From the point of view of each participant, the value of
(D1+D2) deﬁnes a situation of interaction which leads to a cer-
tain speed of the drift of the perceptual crossing, and to a certain
frequency of sensory stimulations. Conversely, this speed of the
drift and changes in the frequency of stimulations can serve as a
clue to click and so to modify the value of (D1+D2).
In all the sessions, both participants are necessarily active in
moving to obtain sensory stimulations. However it happens quite
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FIGURE 10 | Correlation between the width of the attractor “SD” and
(D1+D2). “SD” is the standard deviation of the distance of the perceptual
ﬁeld from the center of the point of stimulation, i.e., the body-object of the
other subject. As the disequilibrium (D1+D2) decreases over time, “SD”
also decreases, i.e., the attractor shown in Figure 4 becomes narrower. The
correlation coefﬁcient of 0.52 is highly signiﬁcant.
FIGURE 11 | Correlation between the frequency of stimulation and
(D1+D2).The frequency of stimulation, “fst”, increases as the
disequilibrium (D1+D2) decreases. The correlation coefﬁcient of −0.62 is
highly signiﬁcant.
often, in one-third of the sessions (8 out of the 24), that only one
of the participants clicks (thus changing only D1 or D2 as the case
may be); the other participant is active only in maintaining the
perceptual crossing. Such a differentiation in the roles is possible
because the functionally signiﬁcant variable is actually the sum
(D1+D2), and each participant can act alone on this variable.
FIGURE 12 | Correlation between the speed of the drift of the
perceptual crossing and (D1+D2).The rate of drift of the mean position
over a 5-s interval, “mvt,” decreases as the disequilibrium (D1+D2)
decreases. The correlation coefﬁcient of 0.342 is highly signiﬁcant.
CONCLUSION ON EXPERIMENT 3
In this experiment, two dynamics are coupled: a rapid perceptual
dynamics of the movements of the receptor ﬁelds controlled by
movements of the computer mouse; and a slower dynamics, cor-
responding to modiﬁcations of the distance“D”(between receptor
ﬁeld and body-object) which is controlled by left and right clicks
on the mouse button. We see that this second, slower dynam-
ics is controlled by the results of the ﬁrst, rapid dynamics. In his
rapid perceptual dynamics, eachparticipantmakes an effort to ﬁnd
and to sustain a good perceptual crossing (sweeping movements
around the body-object of the partner). The participants reveal
that they are able to perceive the orientation of a drift that they
are subjected to. Even when the perceptual crossing is perfectly bal-
anced (D1+D2= 0), the participants can move together in one
overall direction or the other; but here, the participants seem to
perceive that this drift has a “force,” a “systematicity,” that they
can correct by clicking. The clicks of both participants act on a
common spatial variable, the relative distance (D1+D2), which
determines the balance of the perceptual interaction. By bring-
ing this common variable to 0, they produce a stabilization of the
perceptual crossing which, from the point of view of an external
observer, corresponds to a mirror-resemblance of the images that
are presented to the partner (D1=−D2).
Of course it is a long way from this radically simpliﬁed situa-
tion, to those of natural multimodal encounters. We shall come
back to this point in the ﬁnal discussion. The point that seems to us
important here, and that the experimental setup aimed at show-
ing, is that the adjustment between the two participants occurs
even though they do not know what image they present to their
partner, nor what is the exact effect of their actions (the mouse
clicks). They only have access to the collective dynamics, and it
is through this that they guide their actions. Here, imitation does
not result from learning the relations between what is perceived of
another subject (visual perception of facial expressions) and what
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is perceived of one’s own actions (proprioceptive perception of
one’s own expressions).
GENERAL CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
MINIMALISM AND TECHNICAL MEDIATION OF PERCEPTUAL ACTIVITY
The object of the experiments presented here was to create the
empirical conditions for a theoretical discussion by reducing con-
ceptual ambiguities to a minimum. The various individual and
collective components of the observed phenomena can be clearly
distinguished, and sufﬁciently complete explanations can be pro-
posed. To achieve this, the technical mediation serves as a prism
which makes it possible to separate out and to analyze the com-
ponents of complex interactive processes. By reducing the sensory
information to 1 bit of all-or-nothing information, and by reduc-
ing the actions to movements on a one-dimensional line, the
perceptual activities were externalized in the form of perceptual
trajectories which can be easily recorded, permitting a complete
analysis of the sensorimotor relations.
A large number of other studies are currently under way, using
the same sort of deliberate minimalism. For example, we have
veriﬁed that the dynamics of perceptual crossing remains essen-
tially the same if the space of actions is two-dimensional (rather
than the one-dimensional space used here; Lenay et al., 2011).
In this framework, one can also study differentiation of the roles
of the two partners following variations in the relative sizes of
their perceiving bodies (receptor ﬁelds) and their perceived bodies
(body-objects; Maillet et al., 2008). A similar experimental sit-
uation is also being used to carry out “Turing-test” experiments,
where the participants have to discriminate between ahumanpart-
ner and automatic robots of increasing complexity (Deschamps
et al., 2012). Perceptual crossings in one- and two-dimensional
spaces have also been studied using the methods of evolutionary
robotics, which makes it possible to explore the ﬁeld of possible
solutions (Di Paolo and Iizuka, 2008; Froese and Di Paolo, 2008;
Rohde and Di Paolo, 2008). A study of the same type has also been
carried out for theminimalist imitation experiment presentedhere
(Froese et al., submitted).
Now it may be objected that this minimalism only accounts for
an artiﬁcial perception, widely removed from natural perceptual
functions, and so it does not teach us much about the natural
situations. Our reply is that the constraints of minimalism make
it possible to clearly control what was absent at the start, and so
was constituted during the course of the experiment. Even if it is
limited, there is nevertheless a genuine genesis of social cognitive
capacities. The explanatory scheme that we propose for this par-
ticular situation may then serve as a model, as a tool. In fact, we
consider that the boot is on the other foot: if other authors wish
to maintain that other mechanisms are necessary to account for
imitation in natural situations, it is up to them to demonstrate
clearly the existence of such mechanisms – preferably in suitably
minimalist experimental conditions.
DYNAMICS OF INTERACTION AND INDIVIDUAL APPROPRIATION
Contrary to the methodological individualism which poses as a
matter of principle that all social phenomena must be explained
on the basis of purely individual skills and abilities, we propose
an alternative approach where certain social abilities that can be
recognized in individuals are not the cause, but rather the conse-
quence of interactions where an irreducibly collective component
intervenes (De Jaegher et al., 2010). To do this, we have to show
how these collective components can emerge, and how they can
play a role in the activity of individuals. The experiments we have
presented here attempt to ﬁll this requirement, since they make it
possible to precisely deﬁne:
(a) the initial individual abilities, and quite explicitly those that
were initially absent;
(b) the emergent phenomena resulting from the collective dynam-
ics; and
(c) the appropriation by individuals of the collective phenomena
which are constituted in this way.
Recognition of the other: the ﬁrst experiment
(a) In the ﬁrst experiment, what the participants possess from the
start are their perceptual abilities – inparticular, the capacity to
localize a shape in the one-dimensional space of exploration.
However, by construction, the participants have no indication
concerning the shape or the movement which might be asso-
ciated to the other (the shape and movements of the partner
and the mobile lure are exactly similar). Moreover, the body-
object of a participant (that which can be perceived by the
partner) is not perceivable by the participant himself.
(b) The meeting of the efforts of each partner to constitute objects
in his space of perception produces an attractor for the per-
ceptual activities. This attractor does not correspond for either
partner to a deterministic sensorimotor law. Indeed, in the
minimalist conditions that we have given ourselves, if a sub-
ject does discover a stable sensorimotor law, for example the
regular and symmetrical oscillation around a point of sensory
stimulation, that will constitute for that subject the percep-
tion of an immobile object in the one-dimensional space of
action. In the same way, an asymmetrical oscillation around a
point of stimulation that is continually shifted will constitute
the perception of an object in uniform movement. However,
given the minimalism of a single receptor ﬁeld, if the object
moves faster than the participant can move to explore it, its
spatial constitution becomes impossible. One of the points
of interest of our experimental situation resides here: if the
other is, like me, engaged in perceptual activity, the move-
ments of his body-object, like those of the perceptual ﬁeld
which is attached to it, are necessarily too fast for me to be
able to determine them spatially. Here it is thus impossible, by
construction, to recognize in advance a determinate behavior,
and then, by perceptual or cognitive inference, to attribute an
intentionality to it (Premack, 1990; Csibra et al., 2003). On the
contrary, it is this very impossibility to precisely determine the
sensory feedbacks by their actions, which seems to be picked
up by the participants as the clue leading them to indicate
the presence of the other: in spite of the indeterminacy of the
sensorimotor contingencies, the participants can relate their
actions to sensory stimuli which are persistently present while
remaining unpredictable. Indeed, if the participants respond
more often to the presence of the body-object of their partner
than to that of the mobile lure, it is because the perceptual
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activities attract each other – just as in the visual domain,
looks can attract each other.
We may note that the impossibility for the participants to per-
ceive the image that they present to their partner is actually
a necessary condition for the appearance of the dynamics of
interaction of perceptual crossing. If the image that I present
to the other subject was an image that I could perceive myself,
an object for my perceptual activity, the dynamics of a per-
ceptual crossing would become impossible since this image
would no longer be linked to my perceptual activity.
(c) However, as we have seen, the participants remain incapable
of speciﬁcally identifying the presence of the other in any
particular stimulation. This individual failure shows that the
perceptual crossing does not proceed from a speciﬁc recog-
nition of the other. The dynamics of the interactions escapes
each of the individual partners. This will change in the second
experiment.
Recognition of the other: the second experiment
(a) In the second experiment, the only difference with respect to
the ﬁrst one is that the participants possess from the start the
additional capacity to distinguish the three different types of
object (different characteristic sounds).
(b) The emergent dynamics is the same; but
(c) This time the emergent dynamics can be appropriated by asso-
ciating the indeterminacy of the position of an object with
one or other of two distinct sounds. The different intrinsic
properties of the objects can be associated with properties
characteristic of the dynamics of the interaction. An individ-
ual learning of the association between a given sound and a
behavior of perceptual crossing becomes possible.
This opens up a path for explaining, by means of the functional
meaning of the interactions, the formation of internal brain struc-
tures which may participate in the recognition of clues associated
with this situation.The collective dynamics of theperceptual cross-
ing situation brings about a situation of sensorimotor interactions
that are sufﬁciently stable to serve as the basis for associative learn-
ing, i.e., the structuring of a neuronal system which associates
concomitant multimodal input sensations,whether their origin be
exteroceptive, proprioceptive, or resulting from previous actions.
If we apply this explanatory scheme to the development of the
new-born infant, we may suppose that the dynamics of perceptual
crossing with the caregiver is associated with the visual percep-
tion of the intrinsic properties of their face (Lavelli and Fogel,
2005; Itier and Batty, 2009). In a more general way, in the animal
kingdom, the perceptual crossings that an organism exchanges
with other organisms (according to the species, these organisms
will more or less reliably belong to the same species) will make
it possible to set up an association between this situation and
characteristic which discriminate fellow creatures. We may note
that, in its generality, this explanatory scheme does not decide in
favor of either a hereditarian or environmentalist conception of
human social cognition. It does however militate strongly in favor
of an interactionist approach, and thus a fully social approach
to social cognition. The important point is that the dynamics of
inter-individual interaction constitutes a situation which associate
on one hand a perceptual crossing, and on the other hand a par-
ticular perceptual content. The association between this social
signifying dynamics and perceptual contents could equally well
be the result of individual associative learning, or of the selection
of hereditary characters which accomplish this association. The
logical point which is crucial here is that the individual neuronal
structures which participate in the association can be the result
and not the primary cause of this dynamics of interaction. If, on
the contrary, the inter-individual interactions had to be the effect
of prior internal structures – if it were necessary to already have the
means of recognizing partners before engaging in an interaction
with them – then the process of learning, or the evolutionary sce-
nario, which account for the appearance of these structures would
be almost impossible to imagine, because it would be necessary
to associate radically heterogeneous elements (things perceived,
actions performed) without any prior concrete association.
Imitation: the third experiment
(a) In our third experiment, the prior capacities that the partic-
ipants bring to the situation are again those of being able
to engage in a dynamics of interaction. By construction, the
participants do not have any possible perceptual access, either
exteroceptive or proprioceptive, of their own body-object that
they present to the other participant. To the extent that the
actions of clicking produce only a displacement of this body-
object relatively to their receptor ﬁeld, they cannot acquire any
perceptual meaning for an isolated subject. The only access
that a subject can have to the meaning of these actions passes
by the indirect route of meeting with another entity which
is sensitive to variations in this body-object, i.e., passes by
interaction with another subject.
(b) As before, the absence (see “b” in Section “Recognition of the
Other: The First Experiment”) of any access of the partici-
pants to their own body-object explains the instantiation of
a dynamics of perceptual crossing. It is this perceptual cross-
ing which, as a collective dynamics, is sensitive to the relative
positions of the body-objects.
(c) It is the reappropriation by the individuals of the drift or the
stability of their perceptual crossing which serves as a refer-
ence, and makes it possible for each participant to discover the
meaning of their clicks.
One might say that the perceptual crossing functions like a sign
which allows the subjects to know if they are in agreement. How-
ever, this sign is not arbitrary (contrary to a linguistic signiﬁer
which could be linked to any signiﬁed content whatsoever). What
is signiﬁed here by the agreement of a well-balanced percep-
tual crossing, are the very conditions for the realization of the
perceptual crossing in question.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
There is a long distance between the deliberately minimalist situa-
tions that we have just explored, and natural situations. However,
our aim here is to give an existence proof for a certain sort of
explanatory scheme: recognition of the other as subject, or a form
of imitation, can be genuinely explained in the framework of
an interactionist approach, i.e., without appealing to any prior
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knowledge (be it innate or acquired) which correlates what is per-
ceived and what is done. To the extent that we have succeeded, this
explanatory scheme should make it possible to actually account
for the formation of neuronal structures, such as the famous“mir-
ror neuron” system, which are activated both when an action is
performed, and when it is perceived in another subject.
The “Associative Sequence Learning” model (ASL) proposes to
account for the formation of these structures by classical sensori-
motor learning based on the association between the observation
and the execution of the same action (Heyes, 2001). Setting up
a correspondence between internal representations of the actions
performed, and the visual perception of these actions, does not
seem to present any particular difﬁculty when the subject can see
their own actions at the same time as those of the other subject.
However, in the case of opaque actions (the subject does not see
what it is that she is doing), it becomes necessary to imagine an
association between the actions that the subject produces, and
the sensory return corresponding to what she sees on the face of
the model. The problem is that there is then no certainty that the
action seen is similar to the action being performed. For that, there
has to be a social synchronization, as when the caregiver plays the
role of a“model”who actually imitates the expression of the infant
(unless one uses an artiﬁcial mirror). But even then, two problems
remain: (1) how does the infant recognize that she is engaged in
a session of “imitation”? and (2) how can she select the relevant
visual variables on the face that she is perceiving?
The rather particular situation of imitation that we have pre-
sented above proposes a different explanatory scheme which could
help to provide some answers to these problematic questions. A
certain sort of very simple, basic “imitation” could result directly
from the dynamics of the interaction, independently of any delib-
erate internal matching between the actions of producing facial
expressions and the perception of these expressions on the part-
ner. The perception of an “agreement” precedes the knowledge
of what the agreement is about. In this perspective, games of
proto-conversation do not mean that the infant knows that (s)he
is imitating (that her facial expressions are more or less correct
reproductions of those of the adult), but only that the infant has
the capacity to recognize the existence of an agreement in the
interaction (Reddy, 2003; Trevarthen and Reddy, 2007). From
this point on, if the infant perceives the expression presented
by the caregiver at the same time that he recognizes this agree-
ment, a learning process becomes possible. As an attractor, the
perceptual crossing creates conditions that are stable enough
for there to arise an association between the actions performed
and the concomitant sensory returns. The existence of structures
such as “mirror neurons” could be explained by such an associ-
ation between different synchronized ﬂuxes of multimodal and
proprioceptive sensory inputs, sensory data which comes both
from the behavior of the other subject and from the subject’s
own actions. We must insist on the fact that it is a question
here of an association between the face of the partner and the
dynamics of interaction which is socially meaningful (the per-
ceptual crossing). The classical logic of “imitation” is inverted.
Here, it is the de facto “imitation” resulting from the collective
dynamics, which then provides the means for linking the per-
ceived image to proprioceptive sensations. It is only later that
the child will discover that what he is doing is in fact an imi-
tation. On the basis of an agreement in the perceptual crossing,
the subjects may presume that their own facial expression, that
they cannot see, actually resembles that of their partner that they
do see.
A major interest of the explanatory reversal that we propose
here, is to make it possible to engage a dialog between scien-
tiﬁc research and phenomenological descriptions (Varela et al.,
1999; Gallagher, 2001; Thompson, 2007). For example, the phe-
nomenological description of the encounter with the Other as a
radical otherness which refuses any deﬁnitive determination (Lev-
inas, 1979) or that of an intersubjective world in which emotions
are shared (Merleau-Ponty, 1996), ﬁnd corresponding elements in
interaction dynamics that can be objectively observed, and that
can be associated with bodily and neuronal structures. In this way,
we hope that a scientiﬁc study on social cognition can be coherent
with a description of the lived experience of human activity in a
society and a culture where it is meaningful.
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